After having defined the KARO logic for specifying intelligent agents (an amalgam of various modal logics to reason about both informational and motivational attitudes of agents) in earlier work we now turn to the question how to realise agents specified in the KARO framework. To this end we look at agent programming languages that we have defined, and investigate how programs in these languages can be linked to the KARO logic.
Intelligent Agents
Intelligent agents have become the subject of much research lately. The field of agent technology and its foundations lies in between the disciplines of artificial intelligence and mainstream computer science, in particular that of software engineering. Agents are pieces of software (or hardware) that display a certain degree of autonomy. They are not completely reliant on the user's commands, but are able to react to the environment in an autonomous manner, and, even more remarkable, they will take initiative on their own to perform actions to influence their environment in a certain desirable way (goal-directed or proactive behaviour). Agents are thus very much 'situated' in their environment: they are able to both sense ('perceive') and affect the environment they inhabit. Therefore, agents can be viewed as successors to the traditional knowledge-based or expert systems which could reason with symbolic representations of some universe of discourse (or knowledge domain), and could render expert-level advise on problems related to that domain. These expert systems thus acted as a kind of artificial consultants, but could take no actions on their own, and did not affect an inhabited environment.
On the other hand, programming (in terms of) agents, called agent-oriented programming may also be viewed as a successor to the now popular object-oriented (OO) programming paradigm in software engineering. Although objects in the OO setting already possess some kind of autonomy (they have their own data types and methods that can be called by other objects), there is no mention of any autonomy in the sense of displaying initiative or being proactive. In agent-oriented programming these notions are central, and, moreover, communication among agents is much less a matter of just invoking a method of another agent, but rather asking questions to other agents which these other agents may (or may not) handle in their own way.
Agent notions such as autonomy, reactiveness and proactiveness are often coined by means of the notion of a 'mental state'. Such a mental state comprises the attitudes of an agent: informational ones, dealing with knowledge and belief (updating and revising these as new information comes available, thus including reasoning and learning capabilities), and motivational ones, dealing with wishes / desires, goals, intentions, commitments. In order to describe (the attitudes of) agents one may resort to logics which are tailored to express the notions above, such as knowledge, belief, desires, goals, etc. Here modal logic comes in as it has been the traditional tool in philosophy to analyse these notions in a systematic and formal, rigorous manner. We begin with the modal logic of knowledge and belief.
Epistemic Logic
Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge (and belief). It is a modal logic with modal operator K (or B) indicating that the formula that it is given as an argument is known (believed). Stemming from philosophy epistemic logic has been adopted by computer scientists and AI researchers in the 1980's in order to describe aspects of knowledge appearing in distributed and knowledge-based computer systems ( [7, 23] ).
Typical axioms are:
The first expresses that knowledge is true. (One cannot honestly, truthfully and justifiably state to know something that is false.) The second and third axioms express a form of introspection: the agent knows what it knows, in the sense that it knows that it knows something (the second axiom), and, moreover, it knows what it does not know (the third axiom). Of course, this may be very unrealistic to assume for some intelligent agents, such as humans, but often it makes sense to assume it in the case of artificial agents, either by virtue of their finitary nature or by way of some idealisation. In any case it makes life easier, since the resulting logic, called S5, is very elegant (has relatively simple models) and enjoys several pleasant properties ( [23] ).
Often also a weaker form of epistemic operator is introduced, called 'belief'. In some sense this is a more realistic notion, since belief does not have to be true in the real world. In fact, knowledge bases in computer science are usually actually belief bases, since the information stored in them may be false, due to the fact that the world has changed or simply by the fact that data was put in erroneously. Belief, denoted by the operator B, is generally assumed to satisfy the following properties:
Again we observe the introspection properties, but the first axiom now states that an agent's belief is not inconsistent.
One may wonder whether the knowledge and belief modalities are interrelated in some meaningful way. Although in the literature (for example [19, 15, 27, 28] ), and indeed also in several versions of the KARO framework itself (e.g. in [20] , Chapter 5), several interesting possibilities for such an interaction have been investigated, we will assume in this paper only the natural (but see [27, 28] ) property that knowledge implies belief: Kϕ → Bϕ.
Of course, if multiple agents are around, things become both more complicated as well as more interesting. To start with, one can introduce epistemic operators for every agent, resulting in a multi-modal logic, called S5 n . Models for this logic are inherently less simple and elegant as those for the single agent case (cf. [23] ). But one can go on and define knowledge operators that involve a group of agents in some way. This gives rise to the notions of common and (distributed) group knowledge. We will not go into this any further here, since as we will see our agent programming language(s) are not (yet) able to cope with these notions.
Other Modalities
Besides knowledge and belief there are several other modalities which may be of interest in the context of (multi-) agent systems. The first that comes to mind perhaps is that agents may also be endowed with desires that motivate them to perform actions. The philosopher Bratman has argued that to capture the essence of intelligent agents one must go a step beyond this: also intentions have to be included in the description of the mental state of an agent. Intentions must be viewed as wishes that are committed to by the agent ( [1] ). This is important, Bratman argues, for coherent behaviour. For example, consider an agent that wishes to prepare eggs for a meal. Suppose it desires both a hard-boiled egg and a scrambled, fried one, but it has only the disposal of one egg. Then it has to make a choice: either boil it or scramble and fry it, and moreover, if it has made this choice it determines plans for the future to realise its wishes, and it is important to stay committed to the choice(s) made earlier.
For example, it makes little sense to first boil the egg and then try to scramble it, or first scramble it and then boil it. Once one of the two wishes has been selected (committed to) the agent must stick to the realisation of it without switching to the other wish at a moment that this cannot be realised any more! Thus, intentions provide what Bratman calls a "screen of admissibility" for adopting other intentions.
Cohen & Levesque, in an influential paper [2] on this subject, give a formal analysis of the notion of intention. Their setting is a modal logic with operators for belief and goals, with a possibility to express the performance of actions, which gives the logic the flavour of a linear-time temporal logic with extra modalities. In this framework they define intentions as certain (persistent) goals.
Another formalisation of related ideas is provided by the BDI model proposed by Rao & Georgeff [25] which has been very influential in the agent community, too. The model is based on (branching time) temporal logic (CTL*). Agent behaviour is modelled by tree-like structures, where each path through such a tree represents a possible 'life' of the agent. The basic logic containing temporal modalities such as "along every path in the future there is some point where" is augmented by means of 'BDI'-modalities, viz. a belief operator BEL, a desire operator GOAL and an intention operator INTEND. Thus in this model one is able to express how the beliefs, desires and intentions of an agent evolve over time (or rather over possible time lines). Formally, Rao & Georgeff's BDI-model is a formal (modal) logic with a Kripke-style semantics and a logical calculus. Rao & Georgeff were especially interested in the relationship between the BDI modalities. In their paper they discuss several such possible relations such as Belief-Goal compatibility and Goal-Intention compatibility. The former expresses that agents believe that their goals are obtainable in some future, while the latter states that the agents' intentions should be goals. Rao & Georgeff and other researchers have used their model as an inspiration for their work on the realisation of agents. The BDI model has thus given rise to BDI architectures where the elements of belief bases, goals bases and plan libraries are central (cf. [29] ).
In the next section we turn to our own formalisation of BDI-like notions, viz. the KARO formalism, in which action rather than time, together with knowledge / belief, is the primary concept, on which other agent notions are built.
The KARO Logic
The KARO formalism is an amalgam of dynamic logic and epistemic logic, augmented with several additional (modal) operators in order to deal with the motivational aspects of agents. So, besides operators for knowledge (K), belief (B) and action ([α], "after performance of α it holds that"), there are additional operators for ability (A) and desires / wishes (D).
Assume a set A of atomic actions and a set P of atomic propositions. Then the language L KARO is given by the BNF grammar: To deal with actions we consider structures of type Σ, {R a | a ∈ A}, C, Ag , where Σ is the set of possible model/state pairs (i.e. models of the above form, together with a state appearing in that model), R a (a ∈ A) are relations on Σ encoding the behaviour of atomic actions, C is a function that gives the set of actions that the agent is able to do per model/state pair, and Ag is a function that yields the set of actions that the agent is committed to (the agent's 'agenda') per model/state pair. Actions are modelled as model/state pair transformers to emphasize their influence on the mental state (that is, the complex of knowledge, belief and desires) of the agent rather than just the state of the world.
In order to determine whether a formula ϕ ∈ L is true in a model/state pair (M, w) (if so, we write (M, w) |= ϕ), we stipulate:
Here R α is defined as usual in dynamic logic by induction from the basic case R a (cf. e.g. [10, 20, 16] , but now on model/state pairs rather than just states). Likewise the function C is lifted to sets of complex actions ( [20, 16] ).
Furthermore, we will make use of the following syntactic abbreviations serving as auxiliary operators:
¬ϕ, expressing that the agent has the opportunity to perform α resulting in a state where ϕ holds.
• (opportunity) Oα ≡ α tt, i.e., an agent has the opportunity to do an action iff there is a successor state w.r.t. the R α -relation;
, an agent has the practical possibility to do an action with result ϕ iff it is both able and has the opportunity to do that action and the result of actually doing that action leads to a state where ϕ holds; • (can) Can(α, ϕ) ≡ KP(α, ϕ), i.e., an agent can do an action with a certain result iff it knows it has the practical possibility to do so; • (realisability) 3ϕ ≡ ∃a 1 , . . . , a n P(a 1 ; . . . ; a n , ϕ) 3 , i.e., a state property ϕ is realisable iff there is a finite sequence of atomic actions of which the agent has the practical possibility to perform it with the result ϕ; • (goal) Gϕ ↔ ¬ϕ ∧ Dϕ ∧ 3ϕ, i.e., a goal is a formula that is not (yet) satisfied, but desired and realisable. 4 • (possible intend) I(α, ϕ) ≡ Can(α, ϕ) ∧ KGϕ, i.e., an agent (possibly) intends an action with a certain result iff the agent can do the action with that result and it moreover knows that this result is one of its goals.
In order to manipulate both knowledge / belief and motivational matters special actions revise, commit and uncommit are added to the language. (We assume that we cannot nest these operators. So, e.g., commit (uncommitα) is not a well-formed action expression. For a proper definition of the language the reader is referred to [24] .) The semantics of these are again given as model/state transformers (We only do this here in a very abstract manner, viewing the accessibility relations associated with these actions as functions. For further details we refer to e.g. [20, 16, 24] ): ϕ) for all formulas ϕ, that is, an agent is able to uncommit to an action if it is not intended to do it (any longer) for any purpose.
Here update belief , update agenda + and update agenda are functions that update the agent's belief and agenda (by adding or removing an action), respectively. Their formal definitions can be found in [21, 22] and [24] . The revise operator can be used to cater for revisions due to observations and communication with other agents, which we will not go into further here (see [22] ). Note that the revise and (un)commit actions are 'model-transforming' actions rather than 'state-transforming' ones as is the usual interpretation of actions in dynamic logic. (This is the reason why in our semantics of actions we have defined the accessibility relation associated with actions on model/state pairs rather than on states.) This should not surprise us too much, since these actions change the mental state of the agent, which in our Kripke-style representation involves not just one (the actual) state, but rather a number of worlds which are accessible with respect to the modality / modalities of concern.
Besides the familiar properties from epistemic logic (see e.g. [7, 23] ), typical properties of this framework, called the KARO logic, include (cf. [21, 24] ):
The first of these properties says that having the opportunity to do a sequential composition of two actions amounts to having the opportunity of doing the first action first and then having the opportunity to do the second. The second states that an agent that can do a sequential composition of two actions with result ϕ iff the agent can do the first actions resulting in a state where it has the practical possibility to do the second with ϕ as result. The third expresses that a revision with ϕ results in a belief of ϕ. The fourth states that the revision with ϕ results in inconsistent belief iff the agent knows ¬ϕ for certain. The fifth expresses that revisions with formulas that are known to be equivalent have identical results. The sixth asserts that if an agent possibly intends to do α with some result ϕ, it has the opportunity to commit to α with result that it is committed to α (i.e. α is put into its agenda). The seventh says that if an agent intends to do α with a certain purpose, then it is unable to uncommit to it (so, if it is committed to α it has to persevere in it). The eighth property says that if an agent is committed to an action and it has the opportunity to uncommit to it with as result that indeed the commitment is removed. The ninth says that whenever an agent is committed to an action that is no longer known to be practically possible, it knows that it can undo this impossible commitment. The tenth property states that commitments are known to the agent. The last four properties have to do with commitments to complex actions. For instance, the eleventh says that if an agent is committed to a sequential composition of two actions then it is committed to the first one, and it knows that after doing the first action it will be committed to the second action.
Specifying Agent-Based Programs
In order to program agents one may resort to a special agent-oriented programming language. Several of these have been proposed in the literature ( [29] ). The concept of agent-oriented programming was introduced by Shoham in [26] , together with the first agent-oriented language AGENT0. In essence, an agent programming language enables the programmer to program (the dynamics of) mental states. Programs written in such a language are thus 'mental state transformers'. The crux / importance of these language is not so much their computing power (any worth-while programming language is Turing-complete, thus enabling the programming of any (partial) Turingcomputable function). It is more the abstraction level of the language that enables the programmer to think in terms of agent concepts like mental states, informational and motivational attitudes like knowledge, belief, desires, goals, commitments...
The agent language 3APL
We ourselves have proposed a language called 3APL, in which it is possible to program these mental states in an intuitive manner ( [12, 11] ). The language combines features of both imperative and logic programming. Commitments can be changed by means of so-called practical reasoning rules. It has been shown that the language is 'universal' in the sense that existing agent programming languages such as AGENT0, AgentSpeak(L) and CONGOLOG can be embedded into it in a natural way (that is, preserving certain agent-oriented observational behaviour of programs) [11] .
A simplified (propositional) version of the language consists of the core language of actions that we considered earlier in the KARO framework, together with the application of rules r of the form α ← ϕ : α where α, α are actions in the core language, and ϕ is a non-modal formula. (We refer to ϕ as the guard of the rule r.) The interpretation (that is, its operational meaning of application) is: "if ϕ is currently believed by the agent then the commitment to α can be replaced by α ." So the application of a rule transforms the agent's agenda: it modifies its commitments (or 'goals-to-do'). We can express the application of a practical reasoning rule r as an action apply(r) that we can define in terms of the KARO action language: 5
apply(r) ≡ if Bϕ then uncommitα; commitα
In the KARO logic we can therefore reason about the application of such a practical reasoning rule. 6 For instance, we get immediately the following validity:
This expresses that if the guard of the rule r holds and the agent is committed to the action α then there is an opportunity to apply r with result that the agent is then committed to the action α instead of α.
As to the execution phase of the goals / commitments one should realise again that KARO itself does not enforce or specify the execution of actions (whether there is a commitment to them or not). The 3APL interpreter [12] alternates rule application and the execution of goals (commitments). In KARO we can of course specify that if and when a commitment is executed, what holds as a result of this execution, since commitments / goals are just actions from the core language and we can therefore deal with them directly in KARO. The main thing that we must keep in mind, is what happens with the commitments. This involves 'frame problem'-like issues such as persistence.
Another matter that is of importance is that in 3APL tests (also those occurring in if-then-else and while-programs) refer to the agent's beliefs rather than the state of the world, and also atomic actions are assumed to change belief sets. In general atomic actions are model/state-transformers. So in 3APL the special case is considered that atomic actions change the epistemic (or rather doxastic) part of the model. In the sequel we will therefore write the associated accessibility relation R a with an atomic action a as a relation on beliefs rather than model/state pairs. This results in a slightly different semantics than for the standard KARO action language, as we shall see below.
5 KARO semantics requires that in order for the (un)commit's in this definition to succeed (in terms of opportunity and ability) we should have ¬I(α, φ) ∧ I(α , ψ), for all φ and some ψ, as precondition. This could be put into the rule by adding this condition in the guard ϕ. This would then require an extension of 3APL, since at present guards only are allowed to refer to the beliefs of an agent. By also allowing modal (KARO) formulas of the form Bψ 1 ∧Gψ 2 , one could refer to both the beliefs and the (declarative) goals of the agent. The latter could be implemented by having a 'wish base', from which by the definition of G, its goals can be deduced.
6 However, in the logic it is not possible to express that a rule is actually applied. This is just as in standard dynamic logic, where also reasoning pertains to possible execution of actions by means of the [α]-modality: "if α is executed then". There is no operator or expression in standard dynamic logic that asserts that the action α is executed next.
To make this more precise we need some definitions. A mental state is a pair α, σ consisting of an action α and a formula σ, representing the agent's goal(-to-do) and belief bases, respectively. We now define a transition system that indicates how mental states are manipulated ('transformed') by means of the execution of actions, as follows (we use Λ to denote that the goal base is empty):
The transition system T is given by the following axioms:
and the following rule: Since a computation sequence may also contain tests, we define the set of proper computation sequence CS # (α, σ) as the set of computation sequences in which tests are omitted.
If we define that the actions α and β are independent w.r.t. belief σ, denoted α ⊥ σ β, if all non-empty prefixes of the proper computation sequences of α and β starting in a configuration with belief σ are disjoint (i.e. P ref(
This formula states that if the agent performs an action β that has nothing to do with an action α it is committed to, the agent remains committed to α, that is, commitments are persistent with respect to independent actions. So, for example, since obviously a 1 ⊥ σ a 2 for atomic actions a 1 = a 2 and arbitrary σ, we have that |= (Bσ ∧Com(a 1 )) → [a 2 ]Com(a 1 ) for all σ. But on the other hand we have that, given σ = φ, a 1 ⊥ σ if φ then a 1 else a 2 fi, and we do not have that |= (Bφ∧Com(a 1 )) → [if φ then a 1 else a 2 fi]Com(a 1 ) (This is the reason we have to consider proper computation sequences, since in this case w.r.t. non-proper computation sequences we do have that P ref (CS(a 1 , σ) 
On the other hand, if some (basic) action b is performed that helps to fulfil a certain commitment α, then this will lead to a reduction of the commitment in the sense that now only the remainder of α after having done a remains a commitment (here Com(Λ) ≡ true):
In [14] a programming logic is proposed for a subset of the language 3APL without practical reasoning rules, so in fact dealing with the execution of goals rather than rule application. This logic is based on dynamic logic as well. The main result of that paper correlates a logical expression about beliefs that are held by the agent after (a terminating) execution of a 3APL program (i.e. goal) to the operational semantics of that program in a much similar way as the assertion above. The latter, however, treats an execution step rather than a complete (terminating) execution. In fact, the two coincide for 'final' steps, in which thus α = Λ. (In this case the commitment part in the above assertion becomes trivial, since now Com(α ) = true.)
Finally in this subsection we note that in the language 3APL, as in most other agent programming languages, there is no way of expressing declarative goals or 'goals-tobe'. In [13] we have tried to remedy this in a language called GOAL (Goal-Oriented Agent Language). In fact, for this language also a logic is provided (now based on temporal (UNITY) logic) to reason about programs in this language, which inspired much of the ideas expounded in the present section.)
Multi-agent systems and agent communication languages
In order to describe and realise multi-agent systems other issues come in, such as communication between the agents in such a system. To program multi-agent systems in Van Eijk et al. [6, 4] we have proposed a language we here dub ACPL for 'Agent Communication Programming Language', to program communications between agents by means of communicative actions in a KQML [8] or FIPA-ACL [9] -like manner. The framework covers both informational and motivational communication in the sense that it is possible to request and tell factual information as well as request and (in response) perform actions that may be considered as procedural goals for the receiving agent. So, this indeed looks like a multi-agent version of the single agent programming by means of 3APL that we have seen. Instead of only considering observations for adjusting the agent's beliefs now also communications can do the same, and requesting to perform procedural goals (actions) is obviously related to 3APL's practical reasoning rules modifying the agent's agenda / intentions.
So in this setting we firstly have actions like ask(i, ϕ) and tell(i, ϕ), communication primitives that can be used to request and tell information. The semantics is such that in case there is a match of an ask and tell between two agents on the information the one is prepared to tell and the other is prepared to receive, this will lead to a transfer of information. For a rigorous treatment based on a formal operational semantics we refer to [5, 4] .
Besides these 'informational' communication primitives we can also consider actions of type request(i, α), requesting agent i to perform action α. These could be viewed as 'motivational' communication primitives, since they involve requests to other agents to do something, or, more realistically in the context of autonomous agents, to ask a kind of commitment to do an action and put some actions on the agenda. Of course, a receiving agent should accept such a request, which can be expressed in ACPL as accept(α). If requester and receiving agent agree the result of this 'handshake' might be expressed (admittedly, loosely) in the KARO framework by: 8 do j (request(i, α)) do i (accept(α)) ≈ do i (commitα) 9 This has as a consequence that the following holds:
|= [do j (request(i, α)) do i (accept(α))]Com i α expressing that in case that j's request is accepted by i it holds that agent i is committed to doing α in the sense that α is written in i's agenda. As remarked before, the agent may then choose to select it and perform α to handle the request, but it may also do something else, and even uncommit to α again; this depends on the agent's program, its beliefs and (other) goals (cf. [5] ).
Conclusion
In this paper we have indicated how agents specified in the KARO logic can be realised by means of agent programming languages, in particular the languages 3APL and ACPL. It appears that the constructs in those languages are closely related to the various operators in the KARO framework that are used to describe the agent's mentally based attitudes. The road we have advocated here is that of using agent programming languages that are distinct from the (KARO) specification language. We remark here that one might also go another road, and try to execute the logical specifications of agents directly. This approach has been explored in Fisher et al. [3] . However, this must be seen as only initial steps to a direct execution of specifications since only part of the full KARO language was shown to be amenable to the techniques applied there. In the present setting we have been able to consider a substantially larger part of the KARO language.
